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Abstract
Supervenient libertarianism maintains that indeterminism may exist at 
a supervening agency level, consistent with determinism at a subven-
ing physical level. It seems as if this approach has the potential to break 
the longstanding deadlock in the free will debate, since it concedes to 
the traditional incompatibilist that agents can only do otherwise if they 
can do so in their actual circumstances, holding the past and the laws 
constant, while nonetheless arguing that this ability is compatible with 
physical determinism. However, we argue that supervenient libertari-
anism faces some serious problems, and that it fails to break us free 
from this deadlock within the free will debate.
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1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that debates about free will and deter-
minism have an unfortunate tendency to end in deadlock. Recently, 
however, a number of theorists have put forward views that seem to 
offer us a serious prospect of breaking the sort of deadlock that has 
plagued traditional debates.
The sorts of views we wish to examine share a number of distinc-
tive features. Firstly, their proponents are usually willing to commit 
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to a libertarian (specifically leeway-incompatibilist) account of free 
agency, whereby agents are regarded as free only on the condition 
that they are able to do otherwise, holding the past and the laws of 
nature constant; secondly, their proponents usually accept a deter-
ministic account of the laws of physics (or are, at least, willing to 
concede the possibility of physical determinism). And finally, pro-
ponents of such views claim that deterministic laws at the physical 
level are consistent with the presence of indeterminism at the agency 
level. While they concede that agency-level determinism would in-
deed be a real threat to free will, they maintain that determinism at 
the physical level alone poses no such threat.
Adherents typically maintain that the level of agency supervenes 
on the physical level, and that such a supervenience relation leaves 
open the possibility of distinctive level-relative modalities. We will 
call this sort of view supervenient libertarianism, and its proponents 
supervenience libertarians.1 This view has recently been given a system-
atic analysis and defence by List (2014), and our discussion will large-
ly rely on that particular treatment. However, closely related views 
have been proposed by Kenny (1978), Taylor and Dennett (2002), 
Berofsky (2010; 2012), Roskies (2012), Backmann (2013), Ismael 
(2013; 2016) and List & Menzies (2017) (cf. Pernu 2017).
We will argue that this view, if successful, would be a very sig-
nificant advancement within the free will debate. However, we will 
also present reasons to doubt that it succeeds. While the sort of ar-
gument we find in favour of this view generally relies heavily on the 
supervenience thesis, it also requires us to overlook a crucial impli-
cation of this thesis; namely, that modalities at the level of agency 
are constrained by modalities at the physical level. While there may 
be cogent arguments in favour of disregarding this implication, an 
1 List (unpublished) dubs this view ‘compatibilist libertarianism’. However, 
we want to avoid this term for it unites two contradictory terms and it is easy to 
confuse with ‘libertarian compatibilism’, a different view proposed by Vihvelin 
(2000). The main claims that characterise the view that we are focusing on are (a) 
that indeterminism is necessary for free will, and (b) that supervenient, agency-
level indeterminism is compatible with subvenient, physical-level determinism. 
The term ‘supervenient libertarianism’ reflects this idea as clearly as possible. 
(However, in figure 1 below we also use the term ‘actualist compatibilism’, 
which comes closer to the spirit of the term that List (unpublished) is using.)
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explicit appeal to such arguments brings the supervenience liber-
tarian’s commitments very closely in line with those of traditional 
compatibilists. Moreover, it is precisely a dispute about these sorts 
of commitments that has led to a deadlock between traditional com-
patibilists and incompatibilists. Hence, we argue that, despite ini-
tial appearances, supervenient libertarianism does not really provide 
such a dramatic departure from the traditional free will deadlock.
2 The traditional free will deadlock
2.1 Freedom, determinism, and the analysis of ‘able to do otherwise’
Prior to Frankfurt’s (1969) discussion (which raised serious doubts 
about whether the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition of 
moral responsibility) the free will debate has traditionally focused 
on the question of whether alternative possibilities can be reconciled 
with determinism. Compatibilists have traditionally supposed that 
they can, while incompatibilists have traditionally supposed that they 
cannot.
While compatibilists have sought to defend a broadly condition-
al analysis of the ability to do otherwise (Moore 1903; Ayer 1954; 
Smart 1961; Schlick; 1966; Lewis 1981; Berofsky 2002) or, more 
recently, a dispositional analysis (Fara 2008; Smith 1997, 2003; Vih-
velin 2004, 2011, 2014), incompatibilists have typically rejected this 
kind of reading in favour of a non-conditional analysis (Campbell 
1951; Chisholm 1964; Lehrer 1968; van Inwagen 1983, 2000, 2004, 
2008; Kane 1999).
On conditional and dispositional analyses, an alternative course 
of action is understood to be possible so long as it could, or would, 
happen in some given set of non-actual circumstances. On a condi-
tional analysis, statements like:
(1) She could have done otherwise.
Are analysed as meaning something along the lines of:
(1) If she had chosen to do otherwise, she would have done oth-
erwise.
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On a dispositional analysis, statement (1) is analysed as meaning 
something like:
(3) If she had been placed in different circumstances, she would 
have done otherwise.
In contrast, on a non-conditional analysis, (1) will only be true in-
sofar as we are able to make a non-conditional assertion about the 
agent’s abilities, such as:
(4) She could have done otherwise as things actually were, hold-
ing the past and the laws of nature constant.
Clearly, neither (2) nor (3) suffices to establish (4). Much of the dis-
pute has focused on the question of whether we ought to adopt a 
strong, non-conditional reading of ‘able to’ claims, as specified in (4) 
or whether a weaker conditional or dispositional reading, along the 
lines of (2) or (3) ought to be regarded as sufficient to capture the 
true meaning of (1).
Some new terminology will help us to capture the important 
contrast here more sharply. Let us divide those theorists who offer 
rival analyses of the ability to do otherwise into actualists and non-
actualists (see figure 1 below). The former group is committed to a 
non-conditional analysis; they maintain that all and only the facts 
that characterise the actual features and history of a given set of cir-
cumstances matter when it comes to assessing what is possible in 
those circumstances. In contrast, the latter group, which includes 
both proponents of conditional and dispositional analyses are com-
mitted to the claim that only some of the facts need to be held con-
stant, and that we must also consider what might have happened in 
some non-actual circumstances in assessing what is possible in any 
given situation.
This becomes a particularly important sticking point for ascer-
taining whether or not the ability to do otherwise is compatible 
with determinism. It seems as if the ability to do otherwise will be 
compatible with determinism insofar as we have reason to adopt a 
non-actualist analysis of this ability, and that it will not be compat-
ible with determinism insofar as we have reason to instead favour an 
actualist analysis.
Serious disagreements arise when it comes to determining which 
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 3/7/18 6:07 AM
223Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock
of these analyses best characterise the sort of ability that matters in 
grounding moral responsibility, i.e. when it comes to establishing 
which sort of ability we would need to possess in order to justify 
our present desert-entailing practices; those concerned with blame, 
praise, punishment, and reward. We cannot, therefore, resolve the 
dispute about whether the ability to do otherwise is compatible with 
determinism if we restrict ourselves solely to the realm of metaphys-
ics. We also need to address ethical questions about the basis of those 
practices which our favoured ability claims are supposed to support.
2.2 The goal-relativity of ‘able to’ claims
The problem is that compatibilists and incompatibilists often have 
very different conceptions of both what stands in need of justifying 
and what the relevant sort of justification entails. This is especially 
problematic within this dispute, since ‘able to’ claims are essentially 
goal-relative.2
Suppose that someone were to ask you whether or not you could 
kill another human being. It is not at all obvious that this question has 
a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, irrespective of considerations about why 
she might be asking it. The space of possible reasons why someone 
might be interested is potentially very broad. Perhaps she is think-
ing of hiring you as an assassin, and she wants to know whether you 
would do a competent job; perhaps she is a detective trying to nar-
row down her list of murder suspects; perhaps she is your martial 
arts instructor, and she is trying to determine whether you have 
mastered a certain lethal technique; perhaps she is a psychiatrist, and 
she’s trying to work out whether you pose a risk to public safety and 
ought to be locked up; perhaps she is your police chief boss, and she’s 
wondering whether to blame you for your failure to kill a notorious 
criminal mastermind when you had the chance.
It is not at all obvious that there is any single sense of ‘able to’ 
that will yield the right answer irrespective of what she is trying to 
2 The idea that ‘able to’ claims vary, at least with context, has been explored 
by a number of philosophers. Kratzer’s (1977) analysis has been particularly influ-
ential. For a recent discussion of the way ‘can’ claims vary with context, see Maier 
2015. We claim that ‘able to’ claims vary in relevance depending on the goals or 
aims of those using them, as opposed to varying with mere conversational context.
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achieve. If she is your martial arts instructor, she will no doubt be in-
terested in a conditional ability—she will want to know whether you 
would succeed in killing someone were you (for whatever reason) to 
put in a reasonable effort, utilising the technique that she has shown 
you. In contrast, if she is a psychiatrist trying to determine whether 
you pose a threat to public safety, she will not merely be interested in 
whether you could kill someone if you tried to. She will also need to 
know whether there is any serious risk that you will try to, as things 
actually stand. Whether you would kill if you were placed in a war-
zone or something is going to be irrelevant. Whether it is an actualist 
or non-actualist ability that matters depends crucially on what we 
are trying to pin on the ability. But compatibilists and incompatibil-
ists are often engaged in rather different theoretical pursuits in rela-
tion to free will (a point which has been explored by others, see in 
particular Vargas 2005; 2009, cf. Elzein 2013).
Typically, compatibilists take our ordinary practices as a starting 
point, and then engage in a process of reflective equilibrium, aim-
ing not merely to describe our usual practices, but also to explain 
them in an illuminating way, identifying the principles that actually 
underpin those practices. This procedure may reveal new normative 
pressures, pushing us to re-evaluate aspects of our practice, and to 
refine our principles, aiming for overall consistency within our ac-
count. But such an approach generally takes for granted that our usu-
al judgements concerning responsibility and our practices as a whole 
are not wildly misguided. Some theorists even suggest that we ought 
to adopt a theory of free will that is highly ‘resilient’ in that its truth 
must not be thought to hang on whether or not certain scientific facts 
obtain (cf. Fisher 2006; Speak 2008; Capes 2013).
In contrast, incompatibilists tend to take seriously the possibil-
ity of global scepticism about freedom and moral responsibility, and 
hence tend to be doubtful about whether the principles that typically 
do underpin our practices really ought to. In light of this sort of 
moral concern, we cannot take for granted the broad accuracy of our 
ordinary ways of thinking about freedom. The sorts of principles we 
intuitively appeal to within our desert-entailing practices will not be 
a legitimate starting point for any process of reflective equilibrium 
on the matter. If this is the goal, resilience will obviously not be 
regarded as a virtue, since positing this in advance will be question 
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begging: it entails from the start that we will not take any threats to 
the possibility of free will seriously.
From the compatibilist’s own perspective, success is often mea-
sured by a theory’s ability to make sense of the broadest range of 
intuitive responsibility judgements with reference to the simplest 
and most compelling underlying principles. But in light of the in-
compatibilist’s typical goals, this will not be regarded as a sufficient 
benchmark of success. If the goal is to justify our practices as a whole 
in response to serious moral doubts, the compatibilist project may 
seem overly descriptive and lacking in justificatory bite. If deter-
minism is taken to be an external threat to the moral validity of 
the whole practice of blaming and praising, then any account that 
presupposes the broad validity of those practices will appear to be 
viciously circular.
For this reason, incompatibilists are often puzzled by the com-
patibilist’s focus on non-actual conditions. They are typically driven 
by doubts about whether it is fair to blame an agent if that agent 
could not have done otherwise given the way things actually were. 
The incompatibilist understandably struggles to see why we would 
spend our time focusing on non-actual scenarios, when these differ in 
crucial respects from the situation that actually occurred.
Typically, incompatibilists will concede that if an agent had cho-
sen otherwise she would have done otherwise, or that if the agent 
had faced a different situation, she would have chosen differently. But 
they will point out that the agent did not choose otherwise and that 
she did not face a slightly different situation. Moreover, if determin-
ism is true, the agent could not have chosen otherwise or been placed 
in alternative circumstances either. If this is the nature of your wor-
ry, then you are unlikely to see the relevance of analyses that draw on 
what might have happened in non-actual circumstances; such analy-
ses do not appear to provide the agent with alternatives that were 
suitably within their grasp in the relevant (i.e. actual) circumstances.
Given the different philosophical goals that typically underscore 
the sorts of projects compatibilists and incompatibilists take them-
selves to be engaged in, it is unsurprising that neither side is able to 
insist on their own favoured reading of ‘able to’ claims without beg-
ging an important question against their opponents. In order to jus-
tify the claim that one’s favoured reading is the right one, one must 
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presuppose a set of goals which frame the problem from the start in 
a way that one’s opponent is likely to reject.
2.3 Relative and absolute victories
How, then, are we to make progress when we hit this sort of stale-
mate? It seems that there are, essentially, three possible strategies 
here. Firstly, we may, like Frankfurt (1969), seek to bypass the dis-
pute completely, arguing that the broader dispute between compati-
bilists and incompatibilists can be settled entirely independently of 
whether the ability to do otherwise is compatible with determinism.
Secondly, we could give up on any goal of actually breaking the dead-
lock, aiming only to justify our own favoured reading of ‘able to do 
otherwise’ relative to our own conceptual goals. In this case, we 
may achieve a relative victory, but not an absolute one. A relative vic-
tory involves justifying your claim about whether the ability to do 
otherwise is compatible with determinism within the framework of 
your own project, albeit acknowledging that it would beg the ques-
tion to insist that your opponent must adopt the same framework. 
Such a victory can be had insofar as you can justify your position on 
your own terms.
Or, finally, and much more ambitiously, we can aim for an abso-
lute victory; the sort that requires one side to establish a claim about 
whether the ability to do otherwise is compatible with determinism 
on their opponent’s own terms. In this case, the dispute will be won 
even if we adopt our philosophical opponent’s favoured analysis of 
‘able to do to otherwise’. In relation to this debate, that might be 
done in one of two ways:
(1) Establishing that even if we grant a non-actualist reading of 
‘able to’, determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise.
(2) Establishing that even if we grant an actualist reading of ‘able 
to’, determinism does not rule out the ability to do otherwise.
While Frankfurt (1969) tried to bypass this dispute by arguing that 
alternative possibilities are irrelevant to moral responsibility (and 
Frankfurtian compatibilists and source incompatibilists have fol-
lowed his lead), the supervenience libertarian attempts to break the 
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deadlock, as opposed to merely bypassing it. The strategy involves at-
tempting to show that agency-level indeterminism is compatible with 
physical-level determinism, and hence that agents may have the ability 
to do otherwise as things actually stand, holding the whole of the past 
and all of the laws constant, even in light of physical determinism.
Relative victories do move the discussion forward, in some ways. 
They enable us to better understand the divides that underpin the 
free will dispute. But they do not break the deadlock. An absolute 
victory, in contrast, would do so. Relative victories are easily won 
in this dispute, whereas absolute victories are hard to come by. If 
supervenient libertarianism succeeds, it would establish an absolute 
victory in the compatibilist’s favour, and this would be a very impor-
tant, even game-changing, step within the free will debate. Given 
that this argument has the potential to make such a significant step 
within the debate, it is worth giving it serious attention. Figure 1 
shows a breakdown of the debate, and the place that supervenient 
libertarianism apparently seeks to occupy.
Figure 1. Taxonomy of the free will debate.
Many theorists, influenced by Frankfurt, bypass the dispute about 
how to analyse alternative possibilities by simply denying that alter-
natives are required for moral responsibility. This is represented on 
the right-hand side of the diagram. Although it has not entirely ended 
the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists, it has left 
those theorists engaged in a rather different dispute to the present 
one.
The present deadlock concerns the sort of disagreement we find 
on the left-hand side of the diagram. The problem to date is that 
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actualist analyses have tended to be motivated by conceptual goals 
that typically characterise the incompatibilist’s main worries. In 
contrast, non-actualist analyses tend to speak only to the theoretical 
goals of the compatibilist.
Supervenience libertarians give the impression, however, that 
they are actualists: they maintain that an agent could have acted 
otherwise only if alternative possibilities were present for the agent, 
given the actual past history. Hence they adopt a reading of ‘able 
to do otherwise’ that seems to speak directly to the classic goals of 
incompatibilists, while at the same time establishing that this ability 
can be rendered compatible with determinism. We will offer a chal-
lenge to this view, and argue that it actually commits us to a form 
of non-actualist compatibilism very similar to the sort it seeks to 
reject. It is only in light of certain non-actualist assumptions, mo-
tivated by the broadly descriptive and explanatory goals that have 
typically driven compatibilists, that alternatives can be reconciled 
with physical determinism.
3 The supervenient libertarian view
3.1 Determinism
Let us begin with a formal definition of determinism (cf. List 2014), 
which may, for our purposes, be simplified as follows:
Determinism      
A world w1 is deterministic iff any possible world w2 that shares 
the same laws and the same history prior to a given time t would 
share an identical history at all times subsequent to t.
And indeterminism is just the denial of this:
Indeterminism       
A world w1 is indeterministic iff there is some possible world w2 
that shares the same laws and history prior to a given time t, but 
whose history diverges from that of w1 subsequent to t.
A world is deterministic, then, insofar as any world that shared its 
past history and its laws of nature would also share its future. But 
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determinism is normally understood to be a thesis about the way the 
laws of nature are at the physical level. Questions arise, then, about 
what bearing laws at this level have on the level of agency, and these 
push us to think more deeply about the relationship between these 
levels.
3.2 The physical level and the agency level
Non-reductive physicalists typically offer us a conception of the 
world according to which reality is carved into different levels, some 
of which have a more fundamental standing than others. Such a view 
has been popular in the philosophy of mind, where we have good 
reasons to suppose that mental states are dependent on brain states, 
but also have reason to suspect that they are not identical with brain 
states. We cannot understand mental phenomena and processes, and 
predict the behaviour of agents with reference to their neural states, 
and we cannot translate the sorts of language we use to describe 
mental states into neurobiological language. Nonetheless, we are 
aware that there is a very close connection between these levels. A 
very common way of understanding the relation between these lev-
els appeals to the supervenience thesis. When phenomena at some 
level A supervene on phenomena at some other level B, this entails 
that there can be no change in the A phenomena without there being 
some corresponding change in the B phenomena.
This sort of relationship is less strict than identity, since the su-
pervenience relation is asymmetric; it leaves room for changes in 
the subvening B phenomena with no change in the supervening A 
phenomena. In other words, the supervenience thesis allows for the 
multiple realisability of higher-level phenomena, whereby the same 
mental/higher-level phenomena could have had alternative physical/
lower-level realisers. While phenomena at the base physical level fix 
all of the higher-level phenomena, the same higher-level phenomena 
may well be consistent with a range of different base-level underpin-
nings. Supervenient libertarianism utilises the supervenience thesis 
to establish level-relative modalities. This would allow for there to 
be alternative possibilities (analysed in actualist terms) at the level of 
agency, according to supervenient libertarianism, even if there are 
no alternative possibilities located at the base physical level.
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3.3 Level-relative modalities and supervenient libertarianism
Supervenience libertarians thus claim that since multiple realisability 
allows for the possibility that two worlds could have identical histo-
ries at the level of agency, despite having different physical realisers, 
it also allows for the possibility that two worlds that share a history 
at the agency level may diverge from one another after a given point 
in time. It may be, the crucial claim is, that the different futures are 
possible in light of their different physical pasts, but since these pasts 
may realise the same agency-level phenomena, we can have indeter-
minism at the level of agency, despite the fact that the base physical 
level is deterministic. This is nicely illustrated with the following 
diagrams, provided by List (2014: 168):
Figure 2.1: World histories at the physical level.
Figure 2.2: World histories at the agency level.
In figures 2.1 and 2.2 the vertical axis represents points in time, the 
squares represent mental or agency-level states, and the dots in the 
first picture represent different physical states that could realise these 
mental states. When two dots are located in the same square, these 
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are alternative physical realisers for the same agency-level states. The 
figure 2.1 represents the way things are at the base physical level. We 
can see that the different world histories include no branches; they 
are each deterministic.
The figure 2.2 gives us the world as it appears at the level of agen-
cy. And here, we do find branching. So it now seems that given that 
the same agency-level states could be realised by different subvening 
physical bases, it is possible that two worlds are exactly alike in terms 
of both history and laws at the agency level, but then diverge after a 
certain point in time. Hence agency-level indeterminism seems to be 
consistent with physical determinism.
Note, importantly, that on the supervenience libertarian view, 
these alternatives are not merely conditionally or dispositionally pos-
sible: an agent who is ‘able to do otherwise’, on this approach is not 
simply an agent who would have done otherwise if she had chosen 
differently, or been placed in different circumstances. Rather, at 
the level of agency, she could have done otherwise as things actually 
stand, holding the past and the laws of nature constant.
Thus, supervenience libertarianism seeks to show that an actual-
ist reading of ‘able to do otherwise’ can be rendered consistent with 
determinism, and hence seeks to establish an absolute victory; it at-
tempts to show that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with 
determinism, but to do so on the incompatibilist’s own terms. If 
successful, this is a very important step. However, in the following 
section, we will present reasons to be doubtful about whether this 
approach really succeeds.
4 Some problems for the supervenient libertarian argument
There is a serious difficulty faced by supervenient libertarianism, 
which relates to a cluster of concerns about the justification for view-
ing modalities in a level-relative way and the coherency of its stance 
towards the supervenience thesis. We will argue that such concerns 
can be countered, but that doing so serves to narrow the gap be-
tween the supervenient libertarian view and traditional compatibil-
ist accounts, significantly undermining the view’s potential to seri-
ously disrupt the deadlock that has traditionally plagued the free will 
dispute. We will proceed by outlining three closely related worries.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 3/7/18 6:07 AM
Nadine Elzein and Tuomas K. Pernu232
4.1 Taking supervenience seriously
Firstly, there seems to be an inherent tension within the supervi-
enient libertarian argument, when it comes to the stance it must take 
towards the supervenience thesis. The conclusion of the argument 
asserts that modalities at the base physical level are broadly irrelevant 
with respect to those at the level of agency. But in order to generate 
level-relative modalities, the argument relies crucially on the super-
venience and multiple realisability theses. The supervenience thesis, 
however, is precisely a claim about the way in which facts at the base 
physical level restrict what is possible at supervening levels: it says 
that once we have fixed the facts at the base-level, all of the higher-
level facts follow from this.
We might think in terms of two distinct sorts of determinism 
operating at once. On the one hand, we have what we might term 
horizontal determinism, whereby, at the base physical level, future 
events are deterministically fixed by past events. On the other hand, 
we have something that we might term vertical determinism, whereby 
higher-level phenomena are fixed, by constitution or realisation, by 
lower-level phenomena. But there is a worry that the argument only 
really succeeds if we ignore the vertical part of this picture.
An example, borrowed from the debate about whether mental 
content is best understood to be broad or narrow, may help to il-
lustrate why we suppose that there is a problem here. In using this 
example, we do not mean to suggest that the way in which we settle 
that dispute has any important bearing on this one, but the example 
helps to highlight something about the way in which modalities at 
more fundamental levels may bear on what is possible at supervening 
levels.
The example is that of jade, a material that was once thought to 
be a single substance, but is now understood to be two different sub-
stances, jadeite and nephrite. Chemical analysis has revealed that the 
microstructures of these two substances are actually quite different 
from one another, although they appear very similar in terms of their 
macro-qualities.
In reality, there are some clear differences between nephrite and 
jadeite on a macro-level, in terms of such things as strength, texture, 
and colour. For the purposes of this example, however, we ask you 
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to imagine that these substances are perfectly indistinguishable at 
the level of agency. Essentially, in this scenario, jadeite and nephrite 
would be alternative physical realisers for the macro-qualities that 
cause the same agency-level experiences involving jade.
Let us stipulate the following:
(i) Let w1 and w2 be two worlds that share the same laws of nature—
these laws are completely deterministic at the physical level.
(ii) Let w1 and w2 have histories that are identical at the level of 
agency up until t.
(iii) At a microphysical level, however, let w1 and w2 differ in just 
one respect: all of the jade in w1 is jadeite, whereas all of the 
jade in w2 is nephrite.
(iv) In both worlds, Fatima conducts the first analysis of the mi-
crophysical structure of jade at t.
(v) After t, let the worlds diverge at the level of agency; in w1 Fati-
ma’s analysis reveals a jadeite structure, and in w2, it reveals 
a nephrite structure. Fatima’s mental states and actions (e.g. 
what she writes in her notebook) subsequently also diverge.
Note, that this scenario ought to involve indeterminism at the level 
of agency, according to supervenient libertarianism. These worlds 
are indistinguishable prior to t at the level of agency; they share an 
exact history prior to t, and yet they have futures that diverge from 
one another after t.
But once we have established that w1’s future is possible for w1 
only because the stuff in w1 is really jadeite and that the future of w2 
is only possible for w2 because the stuff in w2 is nephrite, it becomes 
hard to see why we ought to regard w2’s future as a genuinely possible 
continuation of w1 and vice-versa.
Consider what is going on just prior to Fatima’s analysis. She is 
in her laboratory with a piece of jade in front of her on the table, she 
sets up her apparatus competently, she understands exactly how to 
perform the relevant experiments correctly, and she knows that she 
will, in any case, uncover the true nature of jade when she conducts 
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her analysis. If the stuff sitting in front of her is in fact nephrite, it 
hardly seems possible in any meaningful sense that her analysis will 
truly uncover a jadeite structure. And if the stuff in front of her is 
actually jadeite, it seems similarly impossible that her analysis will 
truly uncover a nephrite structure.
Given that the possibilities are entirely fixed by the way things are 
at the level of microphysics, it seems very strange to assert that we 
can just ignore the bearing of microphysics when we come to assess 
which futures count as genuine possibilities for each of these worlds, 
given their laws and their pasts.
If this is dubious in the jade example, it seems no less suspicious in 
the case of agency more broadly. At this point, we may have doubts 
about whether we are entitled to describe the sorts of alternatives 
the supervenience libertarians identify as ones that are possible as 
things actually are, holding the past and the laws of nature constant. 
Rather, it now seems that what we will want to say is that if things 
had been different at the base physical level, then an alternative fu-
ture would have been possible at the level of agency. But given the way 
things actually are at the physical level, we may have reason to doubt 
that this is a genuine possibility at all. Once we begin to see the view 
as really putting forward another variation of the non-actualist anal-
ysis, it becomes harder to see why it is supposed to have any greater 
appeal from an incompatibilist perspective than the traditional non-
actualist analyses.
4. 2 Justifying the level-relative focus when comparing world histories
This first concern serves to highlight a second: we need a good jus-
tification for adopting a narrow, level-restricted focus in the first 
place, before we can even use this line of argument to generate these 
independent level-relative modalities.
That is because if we are to succeed in delineating different pos-
sible futures by levels, we need some way in which to justify carving 
the world up by levels, or else we will not be able to draw the rel-
evant comparisons between possible world histories. In order to as-
sert that two worlds share an identical history up until t, after which 
they diverge, we need some justification for focusing only on the 
higher-level, and ignoring its lower-level physical underpinnings in 
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our comparison. The question we must ask, then, is why we are en-
titled to carve the world into levels in this way, and to restrict our 
attention to the higher-level when we are comparing world histories.
It is worth noting that there are many potential ways in which 
we could carve the world up, and carving by supervening levels is 
merely one of them. In theory, any restricted focus, no matter how 
arbitrary, would generate special modalities relative to the portions 
of the world that we have restricted our attention to. But we would 
need a good reason for supposing that the restricted focus that we 
have chosen to adopt is important in some way. Clearly not all such 
restrictions will be philosophically illuminating. E.g. perhaps we 
could restrict our focus just to those parts of the world that don’t 
contain hedgehogs, or just to the parts of the world that are within 
one metre of a spoon. Then we would generate rather different mo-
dalities—ones that are non-hedgehog-relative or close-proximity-
to-a-spoon-relative, as opposed to level-relative.
Obviously, these are frivolous examples. But the point is that we 
would need some good reason to restrict our focus in this way before 
we embark on any attempt to generate these modalities. In relation 
to these examples, we don’t think that such a restricted focus tells 
us anything deep about the independence of possibilities relative to 
these things. So we need to ask what’s so special about the level-
restricted focus we must adopt in this instance.
Why are we are entitled to ignore the microphysical state of the 
world in thinking about modalities, while we would not be entitled 
to ignore the hedgehog-containing parts of the world, or the parts 
that aren’t near spoons? It does not follow simply from the fact that 
we can generate independent modalities by adopting this narrow 
field of focus that we ought to take such modalities seriously. How-
ever, some good reasons for adopting this narrow field of focus in 
relation to levels have actually been outlined. There are two basic 
lines of justification on offer.
Firstly, it is pointed out that we cannot successfully explain and 
predict events at the level of agency with reference to the way that 
things are at the base physical level. If we want to understand hu-
man behaviour and make successful predictions about it, then we 
had better restrict our focus to the level of agency. According to List 
(2014), ‘mental-state ascriptions are indispensable in our current 
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best scientific explanations of human agency. Explaining and pre-
dicting even basic human interactions at a physical or neuroscientific 
level seems completely infeasible, whereas an intentional approach as 
simple as folk psychology has little difficulty making sense of them’ 
(p. 168).
Secondly, further support can be offered for restricting our focus 
to agency-level phenomena by drawing on the fact that we are un-
able to translate the language that we use to describe agency into 
the language of physics, and cannot map the sorts of laws that gov-
ern human behaviour onto the laws that operate at the fundamen-
tal physical level. Our usual way of using language to describe the 
world seems to suggest that we restrict our talk about agency-level 
phenomena to the sorts of considerations that can be identified from 
within the agency-level perspective.
List (2014: 170) draws a fairly explicit parallel with Kratzer’s 
(1977: 342–343) critique of one philosopher’s suggestion (or ‘mis-
understanding’, as she puts it), that it is meaningless for a judge to ask 
whether a particular murderer could have done otherwise, given that 
no one could have done otherwise if the entire state of the universe is 
taken into account. In fact, what the judge meant in the context, was 
to ask whether there were any features of particular relevant aspects 
of the situation (those located at the level of agency rather than, say, 
microphysics), that would have prevented the agent from acting oth-
erwise. List (2014) echoes Kratzer (1977) in arguing that our views 
about freedom ought to track our ordinary-language semantics, cap-
turing the way in which we typically use terms to describe phenom-
ena relevant to freedom. The context in which judges ask about the 
abilities of defendants is situated entirely at the level of agency, and 
the language of abilities only really picks out restrictions that we can 
observe at the level of agency.
List (2014) further notes that, ‘although neuroscientists have be-
gun to identify a number of bridge laws that connect some specific 
cognitive phenomena with certain underlying patterns of brain ac-
tivity, it is fair to say that a global reduction of psychology to phys-
ics is not in sight at this point. Indeed, if the central claims of non-
reductive physicalism are correct, such a reduction is not feasible’ (p. 
171). He continues: ‘Unless the reduction of psychology to physics led 
us to dispense with using psychological descriptions altogether—for 
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instance, if a grand unified theory of physics somehow subsumed all 
of psychology—we might still have to acknowledge an agent’s ability 
to do otherwise when employing the psychological level of description’ (p. 
171).
This certainly does seem to provide some compelling reason to 
adopt a narrow field of focus, restricted by level, which differenti-
ates this approach from other (more arbitrary) ways in which we 
could choose to carve up the world. But the justifications presup-
pose a particular sort of project and a particular set of goals relative 
to which adopting this narrow field of focus makes sense. And this 
brings us to another concern. We must now turn our attention to 
the sorts of goals that such justifications speak to, since goals, as we 
have already seen, have an important bearing for our understanding 
of ability claims and their significance.
4.3 The goal of moral justification vs explanatory and descriptive goals
The goals in relation to which the level-restricted focus is justi-
fied speak very much to concerns about how we describe, explain, 
and predict behaviour. These are interesting and important issues, 
which, in contrast to the earlier examples, can hardly be regarded 
as arbitrary. But the goals in question are broadly descriptive and 
explanatory, and this might call into question the relevance of these 
points when it comes to settling the dispute in a way that is supposed 
to speak to the traditional concerns of the incompatibilist—a crucial 
point if we are aiming for an absolute, as opposed to merely relative, 
victory.
These goals are quite far removed from the sorts of moral worries 
about the justification of our practices that incompatibilists are typi-
cally concerned with. In fact, this seems no less far removed from 
that project than previous compatibilist accounts, drawing on con-
ditional and dispositional analyses of ‘able to’ claims. The explicit 
parallel with Kratzer’s account makes this clear. Note that the phi-
losopher accused by Kratzer of misunderstanding the judge may well 
have been concerned with more than simply interpreting what the 
judge meant to say. Perhaps his concern is that whatever the judge 
means, his sentencing will only be justifiable if some stronger sense of 
‘able to do otherwise’ is established. Of course, meanings may vary 
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with context, but whether a course of action is morally justifiable is 
something that does not obviously shift with context.
This becomes a serious problem if we are hoping to break the 
free will deadlock by providing analyses on the incompatibilist’s own 
terms. The argument looks like such an important step precisely be-
cause it reaches out to common ground. But at this point, the com-
mon ground starts to look illusory. The justifications here appeal to 
a particular set of aims, typically associated with the special sciences. 
In the special sciences, we are essentially trying to formulate predic-
tively successful laws and intelligible explanations.
But intelligible explanations are the sort of thing that we might 
expect to be tethered to our limited and level-restricted perspectives 
as human beings. When we say that we cannot describe and pre-
dict agency-level phenomena solely with reference to phenomena at 
more fundamental levels, we might ask exactly who is to be included 
within the scope of ‘we’? Present human beings? Supercomputers? 
Aliens? Lapace’s demon? The average domestic cat? Future genera-
tions? What we can successfully describe and predict (as human be-
ings with our limited perspective and the present state of technol-
ogy) is an entirely contingent matter.
It is not at all obvious, however, in light of the moral concerns 
that underpin traditional incompatibilist worries, that the traditional 
incompatibilist is able to tolerate such contingency, given the nature 
of her goals. If we are assessing somebody’s abilities with the aim 
of pinning some morally significant conclusions on the matter—for 
instance, with the aim of justifying some sort of retributive pun-
ishment—it seems quite important that our assessments are not re-
stricted by our own contingent and limited perspective in this way. 
And if this is what we are morally concerned about in the first place, 
then the sorts of justification on offer are not obviously going to 
speak to those concerns.
To illustrate the point, consider the way in which shifts in tech-
nology might bring about shifts in our ability to successfully de-
scribe, explain, or predict human behaviour with reference to what 
is happening at more fundamental levels. If we invent better scanners 
and supercomputers, we might, in theory, be able to explain human 
behaviour with reference to more fundamental facts. But does the 
invention of a supercomputer have any important effect on whether 
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agents in general are really able to do otherwise? Might the invention 
of better scanners change whether or not an individual agent really 
deserves the death sentence, say?
For moral purposes it seems quite important not to reduce ques-
tions about what agents can do to questions about what we happen to 
be able to explain and predict. This, however, appears to be precisely 
what supervenient libertarianism does. We can only establish that 
agents are able to do otherwise consistent with physical determin-
ism, by establishing level-relative modalities. We can only establish 
level-relative modalities, if we are justified in disregarding informa-
tion about what is happening at the physical level when we assess 
what’s possible at the level of agency. We can only justify disregard-
ing this information by offering good reasons for focusing exclusively 
on the higher-level. But the justification we are offered for this ap-
pears to rest on rather contingent matters of fact—facts about what 
we happen to be able to describe and predict.
If you are sceptical about the idea that whether a given individual 
deserves praise or blame for a given act is the sort of thing that could 
depend on such contingencies of epistemology, then we ought to be 
sceptical about this argument. The problem once again comes down 
to conflicting goals, and begins to closely parallel the more tradi-
tional debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. On the 
one hand, if our goals are roughly descriptive and explanatory, we 
may well expect them to shift with contingent shifts in what we are 
able to describe and explain with present methods. If, on the other 
hand, the goal is justificatory, and if we are willing to grant that 
there are serious doubts about moral responsibility in the first place, 
then we will not be willing to accept that such normative pressures 
can fundamentally change with shifts in technology or other contin-
gent circumstances.
Moreover, once we have begun to cast doubt on some of these 
steps, we will similarly be doubtful about whether the supervenience 
libertarian really has analysed the ability to do otherwise in terms 
relevant for those who traditionally embrace an actualist analysis. 
Rather, it now seems merely that if things had been a bit different, 
agents would have done otherwise. At this stage, the relevance of 
the position to the traditional incompatibilist’s concerns becomes far 
less obvious than it initially seemed. If we are genuinely interested 
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in what’s outright possible, holding the past and the laws of nature 
constant, it seems that we might have good reason to suppose that 
the base physical level gets the final say here.
To say this, however, is not to say that the fundamental physical 
level has the final say irrespective of our theoretical goals. For some 
endeavours we do have good reason to carve the world up by levels, 
and to delineate modalities in level-relative ways. The dubious step 
comes, we think, when we move from the sorts of justification we 
have for taking this approach in one area of scientific or theoretical 
enquiry to conclusions about a separate area of enquiry, where pos-
sibilities are being assessed in pursuit of completely different goals.
This case provides a particularly stark example, since the argu-
ment tries to derive a moral justification for certain practices with 
reference to rather pragmatic considerations about language and pre-
dictive success, which are benchmarks for success only relative to 
a very different sort of enquiry, one aimed at goals that are solely 
explanatory and descriptive.
5 Conclusion
On the face of it, supervenient libertarianism looks like a promising 
strategy for breaking the traditional deadlock in the free will debate. 
However, on a closer inspection, it is not obvious that this new ap-
proach moves us so far from the traditional free will debate at all.
In particular, we have suggested that the opposing sides in the 
traditional free will debate focus on different sorts of ability, since 
compatibilists and incompatibilists are typically moved by different 
projects and goals, which render different readings of ‘able to’ claims 
relevant. In particular, the compatibilist is often trying to capture 
the principles that do in fact underlie our usual practices, where in-
compatibilists, in contrast, take seriously the prospect that our usual 
practices may be fundamentally misguided, rendering any account 
that takes the validity of those practices for granted question begging.
The challenge for supervenient libertarianism, however, is to ex-
plain why we are entitled to focus exclusively on the level of agency 
when answering questions about agency-level possibilities, ignoring 
the way in which facts about the physical world may have a bearing 
on what is and is not possible at the level of agency. It is when we 
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examine these justifications, that we start to see precisely the same 
sorts of assumptions which have always led compatibilists to define 
modalities in non-actualist terms. This approach is justified in rela-
tion to goals that the incompatibilist typically regards as irrelevant, 
and hence we find that we do not succeed in escaping the deadlock 
after all.
Does this mean that supervenient libertarianism does not move 
the debate forward at all? Our view is certainly not that the account 
does not contribute anything valuable to the debate. It helps to ex-
plain, on the compatibilist’s own terms, what the relevant focus is 
for optimally serving the compatibilist’s goals. What it does not do, 
however, is speak very loudly to the typical goals of incompatibilists. 
Hence supervenient libertarianism does not succeed in breaking the 
deadlock between compatibilists and incompatibilists in any mean-
ingful way.3
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